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The Impact of Directors’ External 
Connections on Their Compensation 





Based on a large sample of directors, I find that directors’ external connections are positively associated with the 
level of their compensation, suggesting that directors are compensated for the value they bring to the firm through 
their external connections. This association holds after controlling for the various factors such as firm and CEO 
characteristics, board related governance characteristics, directors’ attributes such as experience and education, 
industry and year fixed effects, used in prior studies. I also find that the association between the components of external 
connections and compensation is different for different types of directors.  
 





irectors of publicly traded companies are traditionally viewed as custodians of the shareholders’ 
interests, whose responsibilities include monitoring top management and ensuring that all major 
decisions are congruent with increasing shareholder value.1 However, an alternative view of the 
director’s role comes from resource dependence theory which suggests that board members may also have an advisory 
or resource provision role, which may be directly related to firm performance (Pfeffer, 1972).2 In this paper I 
investigate whether directors’ external network connections, as a proxy for their ability to provide advisory services 
or facilitate resource acquisition influence directors’ compensation. 
 
Resource dependence theory argues that the board’s function as a link to the external environment is important in that 
directors bring essential resources to the firm in the form of advice and counsel, channels of information flow, and 
preferential access to resources through linkages to the external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Directors 
also potentially increase access to key constituents such as suppliers, buyers, lenders, and public policy decision 
makers (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000), resulting in reducing dependency between the firm and external 
contingencies, diminishing uncertainty for the firm, lowering transaction costs, and ultimately aiding in the survival 
of the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  
 
Directors’ linkages to the external environment are primarily through their external connections. A board with well-
connected directors can facilitate access to resources such as capital and improved terms of contracts, link the firm to 
important stakeholders, and aid in the formulation of strategy or other important decisions.3 Moreover, directors’ 
external connections could potentially affect the flow and the quality of information available to managers, create 
links among decision makers across firms, and influence the corporate decision making process, leading to better 
management practices, and improved firm performance. Corroborating this argument, Kim (2018), Larcker, So and 
Wang (2013), and Omer, Shelley and Tice (2014) among others document that directors’ external connections are 
positively associated with firm performance. 
  
 
1 See Monks and Minow (2011) for a discussion of directors’ role in monitoring.   
2 Peng (2004, p. 455) states that “it [i.e., resource dependence theory] predicts that the more resource-rich outside directors are on the board to help 
bring in needed resources, the better the firm performance.” 
3 A growing body of literature (e.g., Hwang and Kim (2009), Fracassi and Tate (2012), and Lee, Lee and Nagarajan (2014), documents that directors’ 
internal connections, i.e., the connections with management are associated with increased managerial entrenchment and negative value 
consequences for the firm. 
D 
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Given the importance of directors’ external connections to firm performance, I should expect that these connections 
are valued by the firms and the labor market. Specifically, drawing on the prior empirical evidence which shows that 
directors’ external connections are associated positively with firm performance, I argue that directors’ external 
connections should be reflected in their compensation. Consistent with prior literature, which finds that CEO networks 
are positively associated with CEO compensation (Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 2013; Geletkanycz, Boyd, & 
Finkelstein, 2001; Liu, 2010), I find that directors’ external connections are positively associated with their 
compensation levels indicating that firms value these connections (Geletkanycz & Hambrick 1997). This association 
holds after controlling for the various factors such as firm and CEO characteristics, board related governance 
characteristics, directors’ attributes such as experience and education, and industry and year fixed effects, used in prior 
studies. I measure three different aspects of external connections - professional, educational, and other. I find that for 
outside directors only the professional connections are important determinants of pay, but for employee directors both 
educational as well as professional connections are significantly associated with their compensation, suggesting that 
different employee directors and outside directors contribute differently to firm value.  
 
The prior literature focuses primarily on how director–CEO relations and the directors monitoring role affect board 
compensation. For example, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) document that firms with more outsiders on the board award 
directors more equity-based compensation. They also find that when CEOs have more power over their boards, such 
as when there are more inside directors and/or when CEOs are entrenched, directors are less likely to get equity-based 
or shareholder-friendly pay structures. My approach focusing on the role of director external connections is quite 
different to the previous literature. Using the detailed biographical data available for the entire network of over 393,000 
board level directors and executives provided by the BoardEx database, I construct a measure of directors’ external 
connections. While interlocks capture only current direct ties among directors and executives, my external connection 
measure captures indirect ties as well as direct ties developed in the past and present. 
 
My paper contributes to the literature on director compensation in several ways. First, extant empirical research on 
director compensation has been largely grounded in agency theory perspectives (e.g., Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2006; 
Bryan, Hwang, Klein & Lilien, 2000; Farrell, Friesen, & Hersch, 2008; Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). While I also provide 
some insight into how director independence contributes to the level and structure of director compensation, I identify 
an important attribute in a director that explains director compensation. Examining how directors’ external 
connections affect director compensation provides additional insights, increasing our understanding of director 
compensation. I show that directors are compensated for their resource provision role as well – directors’ external 
connections are significantly and positively associated with their compensation. In addition, my results extend the 
prior literature that shows that CEOs with larger networks of personal connections to those outside the firm earn more 
than those with smaller networks (Engelberg et al., 2013). 
 
This paper also contributes to the existing literature that investigates the determinants of the selection of individual 
directors. Using a subsample of directors who leave their firms, I provide evidence that the external connections of 
these directors increase the likelihood of their getting new board seats. This result extends extant literature that 
documents that CEOs play a key role in selecting new board members (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), or find that directors 
who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract additional directorships (Ferris, Jagannathan, 
& Pritchard, 2003). My result also complements the prior literature that finds an outside CEO candidate benefits 
significantly by having connections to the board of the hiring firm (Liu, 2010).  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the background literature. Section 3 describes 
the data, variable construction, research design and econometric models used in the paper. Section 4 provides 
descriptive statistics on directors’ external connections and compensation and presents empirical results on director 
compensation including several robustness tests. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature on directors’ incentives has general focused on the impact of director compensation structure on firm 
value and decision making and also the determinants of director compensation. Bhagat, Carey, and Elson (1999) 
examine the relationship between outside director stock ownership and effective monitoring and firm performance. 
They find that outside director stock ownership is significantly associated with firm performance and the likelihood 
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that executives are replaced following poor performance. Perry (2000) examines whether the structure of director 
compensation affects CEO turnover and finds that equity-based compensation increases the level of monitoring and 
the likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2005) examine the market reaction 
to the adoption of equity-based director incentive plans. They show that firms with high market-to-book ratios are 
more likely to utilize option compensation for their directors than firms with low market-to-book ratios. They also 
find that the market reacts positively to the adoption of a director stock option plan.  
 
Bryan and Klein (2004) examine whether there is an association between director stock option grants and managers 
taking on more risky, higher net present value projects. They find significantly positive associations between stock 
option compensation for directors and future investments, volatility of returns and firm performance. Becher, 
Campbell, and Frye (2005) examine how regulatory changes affect equity-based compensation for non-employee 
directors. They find that deregulation within the banking industry is associated with an increase in the use of equity-
based compensation for bank directors and that this increase accompanies improved accounting profitability. Adams 
and Ferreira (2008) document a positive association between board meeting fees and outside directors’ attendance 
records. 
 
The determinants of director compensation have been relatively less explored. Vafeas (1999) finds that a significant 
predictor of the adoption of equity-based director incentive plans is the proportion of outside directors. Bryan, Hwang, 
Klein, and Lilien (2000) find that board compensation is structured to mitigate agency problems inherent in firms 
whose management control is separated from ownership. Thus, compensation packages paid to outside directors are 
designed to resemble compensation packages paid to the CEO. Yermack (2004) investigates the incentives received 
by outside directors. He finds that “outside directors receive positive performance incentives from compensation, 
turnover, and opportunities to obtain new board seats” (p. 2282). Linn and Park (2005) find that elements of outside 
director compensation are significantly related to the investment opportunity set. Firms with more investment 
opportunities pay a higher level of compensation to their outside directors than firms with fewer investment 
opportunities. In addition to paying more total compensation, firms with greater investment opportunities compensate 
directors more heavily with stock-based forms of compensation than with cash. They also document a positive relation 
between total compensation of outside directors and firm size. They conclude that firms pay more and emphasize 
incentive-based compensation to motivate outside directors to act in the interests of shareholders when the costs of 
monitoring are high. Linck, Netter, and Yang (2009) find significant increases in director pay and overall director 
costs post Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), particularly among smaller firms. 
 
Other studies have focused on the association between director compensation and board independence. Ryan and 
Wiggins (2004) find that director compensation is determined by the board’s power relative to that of the CEO, and 
varies with barriers to effective monitoring, suggesting that powerful managers may be able to structure directors’ 
compensation to reduce pay sensitivity to overall firm performance, thereby also reducing directors’ incentives to 
monitor managers. Brick et al. (2006) find CEOs and directors indirectly influence their own pay and CEO pay tends 
to be higher when director pay is higher, suggesting that the positive relationship between CEO and director excess 
compensation may be due to mutual back scratching.  
 
The recent literature in finance investigates the impact of CEO’s social connections on CEO labor market outcomes. 
Hwang and Kim (2009) measure social ties between CEOs and outside directors at Fortune 100 firms and examine 
the effect of social ties on executive compensation. They find that CEOs with social ties to board members receive 
more compensation. Overall, this literature looks at director compensation from the agency theoretic framework of 
the monitoring role of directors. 
 
I investigate whether director compensation is influenced by the resource provision role of directors. Engelberg et al. 
(2013) is perhaps most closely related to my study. They find that CEOs with large networks of external personal 
connections earn more than those with smaller networks. I extend this literature by providing results which show that 
directors with more extensive external connections earn more than those with more limited connections, thus 
supporting the resource theory argument that directors’ external connections are valuable to the firm. 
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3. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Data selection 
 
The primary data source for this study is the BoardEx database. This database covers over 393,000 directors and 
executives of over 15,000 publicly quoted and large private companies. It contains biographical information of 
directors and executives, including current and past employment history, educational background, and other activities 
like memberships in general social associations, organizations, or charitable groups, and directors’ qualification such 
as CPA, CFA, or JD. 
 
I utilize three measures for external connections of directors: Professional, Educational, and Other connections. The 
Professional connections category consists of the directors and executives whom the director has worked with, or 
associated with in the past either as a member of the same board of directors or as part of the top management group 
of the same company at the same time. The Educational connections category consists of the directors and executives 
who attended the same school as the director and graduated within two years of his or her graduation with the same 
undergraduate, professional, masters or doctorate degree. The Other connections category consists of the directors 
and executives with whom the director shares memberships in general social associations, organizations or charitable 
groups.4 
 
I obtain director compensation data for the period 2000 to 2010 from three sources, ExecuComp, BoardEx, and 
company proxy statements. I collect compensation data for outside directors and employee directors (defined as 
directors who are also officers of the firm) separately since these two types of directors are compensated differently. 
For example, depending on the firm, outside directors may receive an annual cash retainer, meeting fees, committee 
fees and equity awards. However, employee directors are not compensated for their service on the board. According 
to definitions stated in the Combined Code (2003), I classify non-employee directors who have personal or commercial 
ties with the firm or executives as grey directors and all other directors as outside directors. Cash compensation 
received by each outside director is the sum of fees earned in cash and all other cash compensation, whereas equity-
based compensation received by each outside director is the sum of stock and option awards. Employee directors’ 
cash compensation comprises of salary, bonus, and all other cash compensation, whereas their equity-based 
compensation is the sum of the total value of option and restricted stock grants and long-term incentive payouts. 
 
I obtain firm-specific financial data from COMPUSTAT, stock price data from CRSP and restated quarterly and 
annual reports data from Audit Analytics. The key firm identification variable in BoardEx is “Company ID”. Since 
there is no existing link between “Company ID” as reported in BoardEx and identifiers from other commonly used 
databases (Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2013), I follow Engelberg et al. (2013) to create links between the BoardEx 
database and other databases. BoardEx provides ticker symbols and CUSIP numbers which are derived from the 
International Security Identification Number (ISIN) for companies that are currently trading. First, I match “Company 
ID” as reported in BoardEx with GVKEY (S&P identifier) by ticker symbol and CUSIP. Second, for companies in 
the BoardEx database without ticker symbols and CUSIPs, I match the company name recorded in BoardEx with the 
name of a company on COMPUSTAT and CRSP using the name matching algorithm in SAS. All matches are 
manually checked.  
 
For the director compensation analysis, my final sample is the intersection among BoardEx, EXECUCOMP, 




4 Following Fracassi (2008), I also construct a total measure of directors’ external connections, constructed as the sum of all the three connections 
mentioned above. While not shown in the tables, our results using this single measure of external connections instead of the three components 
remain the same.  
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3.2. Research Design 
 
To examine the impact of external connections on director compensation, following prior studies, I estimate ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions of director compensation on directors’ external connections and other control 
variables. First, I investigate the relationship between directors’ external connections and total compensation, and then 
analyze two compensation components, cash compensation and equity-based compensation separately. I also use 
natural logarithmic transformations to control for skewness in the directors’ external connections. Because there is a 
possibility that the external connection variable is correlated with other determinants of directors’ compensation such 
as such as education, intelligence, skill, charisma, industry experience (Engelberg et al., 2013), I include a number of 
control variables related to directors’ human capital such as industry experience, graduate degrees, and elite 
educational institutions. Industry experience is a dummy variable that equals one if the director has past experience in 
the same industry as that of his or her current company and zero otherwise. Graduate degrees is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the director holds a graduate degree such as MBA, Masters, JD, MD, or PhD and zero otherwise. 
Elite education is a dummy variable that equals one if the director graduated from an Ivy League undergraduate school 
and zero otherwise.  
 
Given that directors could negotiate their pay packages with the CEO or the board, following Ryan and Wiggins (2004, 
p. 498) I include control variables related to the CEO and governance characteristics of the directors’ firms such as 
CEO tenure, CEO ownership, whether the CEO is also the chairman, tenure of directors, board size, proportion of 
inside directors, connections with CEO and/or other directors, and an indicator variable for the director’s type, which 
equals one if the outside director is an independent director, or equals zero if the outside director is a grey director in 
the conventional classification. I also control for firm characteristics such as size, firm performance, growth 
opportunity, and risk and also year and industry fixed effects. Finally, given the large difference between the mean 





4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics on the external connections of directors. On average, a director has 
about 372 (213 median) external network connections to all other corporate executives covered by BoardEx. These 
external connections vary by types of directors. An employee director has an average of 247 (123 median) external 
network connections. A grey director (an affiliated non-executive director)5 has an average of 327 (167 median) 
external network connections. Independent directors have the biggest network connections, with an average (median) 
of approximately 418 (255) external network connections. This panel also shows the statistics for the three components 
of external connections – professional, educational and other. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the compensation summary for the total and individual components of compensation for 
different director types. The average total compensation for outside directors is $277,000. The grey directors earn an 
average of $721,000, whereas the independent directors earn an average of $244,000. In contrast the employee 
directors earn an average of $12.4 million. The breakup of total compensation suggests that cash compensation for 
outside directors consists of less than 25% of the total compensation, whereas for employee directors that proportion 
is less than 20%. The median total compensation is much lower than the average suggesting skewness in the data. 
 
Panel C of Table 1 presents summary statistics for the other key variables used in my models. The average total assets 
of the firms in my sample are approximately $49.3 billion. The median total assets are $10.5 billion. The average 
market-to-book asset ratio is 3.08, and the median market-to-book asset ratio is 2.31. The return on assets (ROA) is 
0.054 on average, and the median is 0.050. The average stock return is 0.003, and the median is 0.009. The average 
 
5 According to definitions stated in the Combined Code (2003), grey directors have personal or commercial ties with the firm or executives. Such 
ties are inferred where the non-executive director is related to any of the firm’s directors, advisors or senior employees, has served on the board for 
more than nine years, was formerly an employee of the company or group, has received additional remuneration apart from director’s fees, has any 
material business relationships with the company, represents a significant shareholder, or is part of an interlocking director arrangement. 
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tenure of a director is approximately 8 years, and the median is 6 years. Approximately 40 percent of the directors 
have a social tie with the CEO of the firm for which the director serves. The average number of directors per firm is 
11. A firm has approximately 22 percent of inside directors on the board on average, and the median is 18 percent. 
The average tenure of CEOs is approximately 6.5 years, and the median is 4.8 years. Approximately 80 percent of the 
CEOs are also the chairpersons of the board.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Panel A: Directors’ External Connections by Types of Directors and Types of Connections 
Type of Director N Mean Median Max StdDev 
Employee Directors  79,667     
Total External Connections  247.0 123 3,038 315.2 
Professional Connections  99.2 34 1,191 155.4 
Educational Connections  21.7 6 273 41.9 
Other Connections  126.0 48 2,039 223.7 
Grey Directors 47,220     
Total External Connections  326.8 167 4,563 419.1 
Professional Connections  139.3 44 1,953 122.8 
Educational Connections  32.9 8 1,032 26.8 
Other Connections  154.6 64 2,803 189.8 
Independent Directors 266,594     
Total External Connections  417.7 255 4,688 477.7 
Professional Connections  179.8 57 1,964 231.8 
Educational Connections  58.0 11 900 71.8 
Other Connections  179.9 82 2,946 304.4 
All Directors 393,481     
Total External Connections  372.2 213 4,688 447.9 
Professional Connections  143.2 54 1,673 224.1 
Educational Connections  39.0 13 407 61.1 
Other Connections  190.0 73 3,150 329.0 
 
Panel B: Director Compensation by Types of Directors 
Type of Director N Mean Median Q1 Q3 StdDev 
Total Compensation ($1000s) 
Outside Directors 30,743 277 178 113 253 1,726 
Grey Directors 2,136 721 149 80 257 3,320 
Independent Directors 28,607 244 180 116 253 1,537 
Employee Directors 5,933 12,410 7,416 3,678 14,728 24,348 
Excluding CEO 1,917 8,092 4,404 2,227 9,146 11,596 
Cash Compensation ($1000s) 
Outside Directors 30,743 63 54 30 82 116 
Grey Directors 2,136 128 40 25 68 397 
Independent Directors 28,607 59 55 30 83 48 
Employee Directors 5,933 1,781 1,100 779 1,898 2,666 
Excluding CEO 1,917 1,598 914 600 1,575 2,602 
Equity-based Compensation ($1000s) 
Outside Directors 30,743 211 108 60 182 1,700 
Grey Directors 2,136 585 88 42 177 3,134 
Independent Directors 28,607 183 109 61 183 1,537 
Employee Directors 5,933 10,592 5,899 2,430 12,357 23,733 
Excluding CEO 1,917 6,471 3,228 1,370 7,556 10,646 
*For Outside Directors: Total Compensation = Cash Compensation + Equity-Based Compensation + All Other Compensation; Cash compensation 
= Fees Earned in Cash; Equity-based Compensation = Stock Awards + Option Awards; 
*For Employee Directors: Total Compensation = Cash Compensation + Equity-Based Compensation + All Other Compensation; Cash compensation 
= Salary + Bonus; Equity-based Compensation = Option Pay; 
 
(Table 1, Panel C continued on next page) 
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(Table 1 continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Other Key Variables 
Variable Mean Median StdDev Q1 Q3 
Total Assets ($ millions) 49,347 10,536 3,862 28,926 172,935 
Market-to-Book 3.083 2.308 1.517 3.732 19.673 
ROA 0.054 0.050 0.022 0.092 0.079 
Stock return 0.003 0.009 -0.015 0.029 0.065 
Leverage 0.645 0.239 0.092 0.646 2.105 
Board Size 11.299 11.000 9.000 13.000 2.658 
CEO tenure (years) 6.501 4.800 2.100 8.900 5.972 
CEO ownership (%) 0.729 0.000 0.000 0.086 3.272 
Number of Independent 
Directors 8.858 9.000 7.000 10.000 2.541 
% of Inside Directors 21.538 18.182 10.000 28.571 0.134 
Director tenure (years) 8.161 6.300 2.900 11.300 7.117 
CEO/Chair Duality (%) 79.897     
Tie to the CEO (%) 39.516     
Intra-Board Ties (%) 10.980     
Industry Experience (%) 26.778     
Graduate Degree (%) 55.410     
Elite Education (%) 40.302     
* Market-to-book is the ratio of market to book equity. ROA is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by the 
book value of assets. Stock return is measured as annual stock return plus dividends reinvested. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to firm assets. 
Firm age is calculated as current year minus year of founding. Board size is the number of directors on the board. CEO tenure is the time since the 
executive became CEO at the firm. The fraction of independent directors is calculated as the percentage of directors defined as independent 
directors. The fraction of busy directors is calculated as the percentage of directors holding more than two directorships. CEO/Chair Duality is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one when CEO is serving as chairman of the board. Intra-Board Ties are measured by the number of pairs of 
connected directors scaled by the number of pairs of board members. Tie to the CEO is measured by the fraction of the independent directors having 
social tie to the CEO. Director tenure is the time since the director became director at the firm. Industry experience is the proportion of the board 
members possessing the same industry experience. Board experience is the sum of the cumulative years directors have served as a director scaled 
by the number of board members. Graduate degrees is the fraction of directors holding graduate degrees such as MBA, Master, JD, MD, or PhD 
degree on the board. Elite education is measured by the percent of directors who graduated from Ivy League undergraduate schools. 
 
 
Table 2 provides a correlation matrix for the key variables used in the analysis. Although directors’ external 
connections variable has a significant positive correlation with most of the other variables, the magnitude is higher 
with firm and board sizes, market-to-book, industry experience, and ROA. External connections are also significantly 
negatively correlated with CEO tenure and stock ownership, percentage of inside directors and director tenure. This 
suggests that less experienced CEOs with less power in the firm are more likely to have outside directors on the board 
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Table 2. Pearson Correlations of Key Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. External Connections            
2. Total Compensation 0.09***           
3. Cash Compensation 0.10*** 0.39***          
4.Equity-Based Compensation 0.08*** 0.99*** 0.28***         
5. Total Assets 0.21*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.01***        
6. Market to Book 0.02*** 0.01* 0.00 0.01* -0.02***       
7. ROA 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.01* 0.03*** -0.10*** 0.11***      
8. Stock Return 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00  0.04*** 0.28***     
9. Leverage 0.00 0.00 0.03*** -0.01  0.22*** -0.03*** -0.22*** -0.49***    
10. Volatility -0.08*** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.01** 0.04***   
11. Board Size 0.12*** 0.01** 0.03*** 0.01* 0.28*** -0.04*** -0.07*** 0.00  0.05*** -0.07***  
12. CEO Tenure -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.04*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.00  -0.01* 0.00  0.00  
13. CEO Ownership -0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.04*** -0.04*** 0.00 0.03*** -0.03*** 0.08*** -0.03*** -0.09*** 
14. # of Independent Directors  0.15*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.29*** -0.03*** -0.09*** -0.01  0.05*** -0.06*** 0.77*** 
15. % of Inside Directors -0.10*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.04*** -0.08*** 0.00 0.04*** 0.02*** -0.02*** 0.00  0.02*** 
16. Director Tenure -0.06*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -0.06*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.00  -0.01* 0.01  -0.02*** 
17. CEO/Chair Duality (%) 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.01** 0.01  -0.04*** 0.09*** 
18. Tie to the CEO  0.15*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.08*** -0.02*** -0.08*** -0.03*** 0.06*** -0.01* 0.15*** 
19. Intra-Board Ties  0.26*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.03*** 0.12*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01  -0.02*** 0.05*** 
20. Industry Experience 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.04*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** 
21. Graduate Degree 0.13*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.03*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.03*** -0.03*** -0.01  0.00  
22. Elite Education 0.10*** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00  0.03*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.01** -0.01** -0.01  -0.01*** 
*, **, and *** indicate correlation is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1. External Connections            
2. Total Compensation            
3. Cash Compensation            
4. Equity-Based Compensation            
5. Total Assets            
6. Market to Book            
7. ROA            
8. Stock Return            
9. Leverage            
10. Volatility            
11. Board Size            
12. CEO Tenure            
13. CEO Ownership 0.05***           
14. # of Independent Directors  -0.01  -0.16***           
15. % of Inside Directors 0.00  0.15*** -0.60***         
16. Director Tenure 0.69*** 0.07*** -0.05*** 0.05***        
17. CEO/Chair Duality (%) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05***       
18. Tie to the CEO  0.01*** 0.00  0.11*** 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.04***      
19. Intra-Board Ties  0.04*** 0.00  0.09*** -0.08*** 0.03*** 0.01  0.34***     
20. Industry Experience -0.05*** 0.01*** -0.03*** 0.00  0.01*** -0.01* 0.02*** 0.10***    
21. Graduate Degree 0.05*** -0.02*** 0.07*** -0.12*** 0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.16*** 0.06***   
22. Elite Education 0.01*** 0.00  0.01  -0.03*** 0.02*** -0.01** 0.00  0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 
*, **, and *** indicate correlation is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
4.2. Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 reports my regression results on the relationship between the components of outside directors’ external 
connections and compensation. The results shown are based on a linear model specification where the raw value 
outside director compensation is regressed on various determinants identified in prior studies of director 
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compensation. For brevity, I do not present the results of log-linear specifications, which remain similar to those 
presented in the paper. Column (1) reports the relationship between components of outside directors’ external 
connections and total compensation. I expect the coefficients of directors’ connections to be positive. My results show 
that the estimated coefficient of outside directors’ professional connection is positive and statistically significant (p < 
0.01). The point estimate of this coefficient implies that an additional professional connection is worth roughly $230 
(0.13% of median total compensation). Column (2) and (3) show the results from regressing cash and equity 
compensation of outside directors on external connections. The coefficient of outside directors’ professional 
connections in both regressions are also positive and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that cash and equity components 
of compensation of outside directors with extensive professional connections are higher than that of outside directors 
with limited connections.  
 
Among three components, Professional and Other connections are significantly associated with outside directors’ 
compensation, whereas Educational connection is not as significant. This finding is in contrast to Engelberg et al. 
(2013), who document that each of the three components of CEOs’ external connection variable “Rolodex” is 
individually significant, with Educational connections being about four times as valuable as either Professional or 
Other connections. This result could be a result of the different roles that CEOs and directors play in a firm and are 
consistent with findings in Kim (2018), who documents that directors’ professional connections are the ones that are 
more closely associated with a firm’s performance and hence, are likely to benefit the firm the most. Hence, the firm 
may consider outside directors’ professional connections more favorably than other connections in deciding their 
compensation. The impact of directors’ other personal characteristics on their compensation is also interesting. While 
the effect of Industry experience on outside director compensation is not statistically significant, Graduate degrees 
and Elite education increase outside directors’ compensation. These associations still hold after controlling for year 
and industry fixed effects. Overall, my results indicate that outside directors’ external connections are significant 
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Table 3. The Relationship between External Connections of Outside Directors and Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Professional connections 0.231
*** 0.020*** 0.207*** 
(9.17) (13.73) (8.32) 
Educational connections 0.119
* 0.004  0.117* 
(1.92) (1.20) (1.90) 
Other connections 0.120
** 0.009*** 0.111** 
(2.22) (2.97) (2.08) 
Log(Total assets) -27.824
** 3.867*** -32.462*** 
(-2.44) (5.83) (-2.88) 
Log(Market to book) -4.891  -2.764
** -2.970  
(-0.24) (-2.30) (-0.15) 
ROAt-1 
348.199** 14.140  328.842* 
(2.05) (1.43) (1.96) 
Stock Returnt-1 
164.983  17.228  156.080  
(0.63) (1.12) (0.60) 
Director tenure 11.668
*** 2.626*** 8.675*** 
(4.69) (18.13) (3.53) 
CEO Connections -22.790  0.541  -23.803  (-0.88) (0.36) (-0.93) 
Intra-board connections 78.530
** -5.107** 84.290** 
(2.06) (-2.31) (2.24) 
Independent director -531.830
*** -68.755*** -457.689*** 
(-11.27) (-25.02) (-9.80) 
Industry experience 64.720
** 7.311*** 54.462** 
(2.36) (4.57) (2.00) 
Graduate degrees 90.393
*** 7.693*** 83.022*** 
(3.90) (5.69) (3.62) 
Elite education 71.601
*** 3.915*** 67.583*** 
(3.16) (2.97) (3.02) 
Log(Board size) -51.477  6.830
* -58.648  
(-0.81) (1.84) (-0.93) 
Proportion of inside directors -196.057
* -5.809  -186.533  
(-1.70) (-0.86) (-1.63) 
CEO tenure -12.754
*** -2.685*** -9.948*** 
(-4.66) (-16.83) (-3.67) 
Dual CEO/Chair -84.667
*** -17.598*** -65.347** 
(-2.97) (-10.61) (-2.32) 
Leverage  -1.420  -0.667
** -0.752  
(-0.25) (-2.03) (-0.13) 
Regulation dummy  10.963  5.512
** 5.616  
(0.27) (2.29)  (0.14) 
CEO ownership 0.758  0.682
*** 0.112  
(0.21) (3.19) (0.03) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  27,656 27,656 27,656 
R2 0.0183 0.0951 0.0153 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
Next, I look at employee directors’ compensation. Table 4 reports my regression results on the relationship between 
components of employee directors’ external connections and compensation. Consistent with the results in Table 3, 
these results show that employee directors’ professional and other connections are significantly associated with total 
as well as individual components of total compensation. The estimated coefficient of employee directors’ professional 
connections on total compensation suggests that an additional professional connection is worth roughly $1,900 (0.03% 
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of median total compensation) for an employee director. The estimated coefficient of employee directors’ other 
connections on total compensation suggests that an additional other connection is worth roughly $6,000 of total 
compensation for employee directors. The association of both professional and other connections of employee 
directors with their compensation indicates that the firm considers both professional and other connections as 
important determinants of pay for employee directors. Similar to the results with outside directors, while the effect of 
Industry experience on employee director compensation is not significant, Graduate degree and Elite education 
increase employee directors’ compensation. 
 
 
Table 4. The Relationship between External Connections of Employee Directors and Compensation 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Professional connections 1.914
** 0.236*** 1.697** 
(2.30) (2.90) (2.07) 
Educational connections 5.677 0.611
* 5.179 
(1.58) (1.74) (1.46) 
Other connections 6.765
*** 0.874*** 5.902*** 
(3.07) (4.06) (2.72) 
Log(Total assets) 3,915.346
*** 475.012*** 3,400.884*** 
(11.13) (13.84) (9.82) 
Log(Market to book) 3,225.574
*** 37.637 3,145.189*** 
(5.19) (0.62) (5.14) 
ROAt-1 
10,422.943** -90.462 10,422.394** 
(2.38) (-0.21) (2.42) 
Stock Returnt-1 
16,261.752** 1,244.695* 15,011.607** 
(2.21) (1.74) (2.08) 
Director tenure 121.452
** 0.679 115.590** 
(2.56) (0.15) (2.47) 
CEO Connections 80.605 122.350
* -19.438 
(0.11) (1.76) (-0.03) 
Intra-board connections 11,613.607
*** 693.638*** 10,932.802*** 
(4.57) (2.80) (4.37) 
Industry experience -590.108 -4.170 -590.819 (-0.89) (-0.06) (-0.91) 
Graduate degrees 4,238.696
*** 254.870*** 3,974.332*** 
(5.96) (3.67) (5.67) 
Elite education 1,430.810
** 12.005 1,412.106** 
(2.07) (0.18) (2.08) 
Log(Board size) -6,469.496
*** -830.943*** -5,605.809*** 
(-3.63) (-4.78) (-3.19) 
Proportion of inside directors -4,489.112 877.453
*** -5,357.469* 
(-1.48) (2.96) (-1.79) 
CEO tenure -35.580 29.649
*** -63.564 
(-0.40) (3.39) (-0.72) 
Dual CEO/Chair 514.159 122.312 388.681 (0.54) (1.33) (0.42) 
Leverage  -103.977 73.625
*** -175.478 
(-0.60) (4.34) (-1.03) 
Regulation dummy  623.076 -177.426 811.533 (0.50) (-1.46) (0.66) 
CEO ownership 348.143
*** -11.285 347.590*** 
(4.34) (-1.44) (4.40) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5,262 5,262 5,262 
R2 0.1182 0.2022 0.1055 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Overall, my results suggest that similar to outside directors, the compensation of employee directors is higher when 
they have more external connections. Taken together, there is strong and consistent evidence that directors’ external 
connections have significant impact on their compensation. The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 extend similar 
empirical results reported in Engelberg et al. (2013) that only consider CEO’s compensation. 
 
I ran a subsample analysis for outside directors excluding grey directors who were former CEOs of the firm and 
continue to serve on the board. In Table 5, I report that the subsample of independent directors shows similar results 
to those reported in Table 3. These findings suggest that outside directors with more extensive connections earn more 
than those with more limited connections, indirectly supporting the argument that directors’ external connections are 
strategically valuable to firms and perhaps directors are being paid for such connections.  
 
As discussed earlier, my sample data on directors’ compensation appears to have right skewness (shown in Table 1) 
and there may be potential outliers. Following previous research (Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999; Hall & Liebman 1998; 
Milbourn, 2003), I repeat the analysis presented in Tables 3 and 4 using median regression to reduce the influence of 
outliers. Tables 6 and 7 present the results of the median regressions. My main findings documented earlier become 
stronger under this alternative model estimation and are consistent with Engelberg et al. (2013). The results based on 
the median regressions also suggest that after controlling for the governance-related determinants of director 
compensation, there is still a positive relation between directors’ external connections and director compensation.  
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Table 5. The Relationship Between Outside Directors’ External Connections and Compensation: A Subsample Analysis 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Professional connections 0.124
*** 0.009*** 0.111*** 
(5.29) (14.82) (4.74) 
Educational connections 0.098
* 0.002  0.097* 
(1.71) (1.39) (1.71) 
Other connections 0.072  0.003
** 0.069  
(1.44) (2.30) (1.38) 
Log(Total assets) -24.231
** 3.954*** -28.309*** 
(-2.29) (14.45) (-2.68) 
Log(Market to book) -3.533  -2.134
** -1.939  
(-0.18) (-4.28) (-0.10) 
ROAt-1 
389.426** 11.249*** 376.947** 
(2.46) (2.74) (2.38) 
Stock Returnt-1 
96.546  5.866  94.503  
(0.39) (0.91) (0.38) 
Director tenure 1.593  1.025
*** 0.509  
(0.63) (15.74) (0.20) 
CEO Connections -53.341
** -0.965  -53.045** 
(-2.19) (-1.53) (-2.17) 
Intra-board connections 169.870
*** 3.905*** 165.916*** 
(4.86) (4.31) (4.74) 
Industry experience 68.313
*** 3.016*** 62.852** 
(2.68) (4.57) (2.47) 
Graduate degrees 78.010
*** 4.126*** 74.351*** 
(3.60) (7.36) (3.44) 
Elite education 63.616
*** 1.103** 61.926*** 
(3.02) (2.02) (2.94) 
Log(Board size) -75.576  4.675
*** -81.787  
(-1.27) (3.03) (-1.37) 
Proportion of inside directors -42.313  2.443  -42.566  (-0.38) (0.86) (-0.39) 
CEO tenure 0.590  -0.592
*** 1.013  
(0.22) (-8.40) (0.37) 
Dual CEO/Chair -6.430  -5.633
*** 0.118  
(-0.24) (-8.17) (0.00) 
Leverage  0.062  -0.441
*** 0.449  
(0.01) (-3.31) (0.09) 
Regulation dummy  -7.540  2.747
*** -9.878  
(-0.20) (2.77) (-0.26) 
CEO ownership -0.064  0.636
*** -0.587  
(-0.02) (7.20) (-0.17) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  25,761 25,761 25,761 
R2 0.0106 0.0924 0.0099 
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Table 6. The Relationship between External Connections of Outside Directors and Compensation: Median Regression 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity-Based Compensation 
Professional connections 0.027
*** 0.004*** 0.015*** 
(18.28) (8.15) (10.05) 
Educational connections 0.022
*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
(5.25) (7.31) (2.72) 
Other connections 0.016
*** 0.008** 0.005** 
(6.10) (2.05) (2.01) 
Log(Total assets) 9.136
*** 5.629*** 4.666*** 
(20.03) (27.96) (10.31) 
Log(Market to book) -1.828 -2.232
* 9.601** 
(1.44) (-1.93) (2.05) 
ROAt-1 
97.137*** 25.942*** 84.551*** 
(9.90) (6.20) (9.36) 
Stock Returnt-1 
14.812  -35.035*** 31.333*** 
(1.49) (-7.04) (3.15) 
Director tenure 1.340
*** 0.790*** 0.163  
(10.48) (11.35) (1.28) 
CEO Connections -23.941
*** -4.467*** -17.678*** 
(-25.39) (-9.18) (-19.14) 
Intra-board connections 83.464
*** 6.193*** 73.335*** 
(36.36) (7.99) (28.74) 
Independent director -3.996  -0.186  -1.320  (-1.61) (-0.25) (-0.67) 
Industry experience 70.830
*** 5.247*** 62.179*** 
(41.08) (8.46) (31.90) 
Graduate degrees 51.507
*** 11.041*** 39.158*** 
(53.25) (21.11) (40.21) 
Elite education 24.003
*** 2.731*** 19.154*** 
(22.37) (5.11) (17.96) 
Log(Board size) -58.450
*** 7.231*** -61.393*** 
(-21.42) (6.00) (-25.18) 
Proportion of inside directors -53.378
*** -59.657*** -6.710  
(-12.70) (-35.18) (-1.58) 
CEO tenure -0.981
*** -0.398*** -0.210  
(-7.31) (-5.58) (-1.61) 
Dual CEO/Chair -15.555
*** -7.425*** -5.336*** 
(-13.04) (-12.60) (-4.43) 
Leverage  -2.343
*** -0.808*** -1.694*** 
(-4.41) (-3.76) (-4.87) 
Regulation dummy  -1.029  1.178
** -0.239  
(-1.00) (2.36) (-0.26) 
CEO ownership 0.431
** 0.367*** -0.065  
(2.48) (3.43) (-0.37) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  27,886 27,886 27,886 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7. The Relationship between External Connections of Employee Directors and Compensation: Median Regression 
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity Based  Compensation 
Professional connections 3.020
*** 0.321*** 2.579*** 
(10.09) (9.95) (10.11) 
Educational connections 2.546
** 0.683*** 2.108** 
(2.27) (4.57) (2.20) 
Other connections 1.812
** 0.108  0.913  
(2.28) (1.13) (1.40) 
Log(Total assets) 1,965.483
*** 147.626*** 1,643.183*** 
(24.04) (13.58) (21.62) 
Log(Market to book) 1,816.534
*** 21.312  1,926.061*** 
(10.74) (1.26) (11.81) 
ROAt-1 
542.403 -39.664  -552.345  
(0.45) (-0.46) (-0.48) 
Stock Returnt-1 
1,345.023  954.561*** -1,657.840  
(0.81) (6.36) (-1.18) 
Director tenure -0.627  5.559
*** -3.980  
(-0.07) (3.74) (-0.45) 
CEO Connections -297.969
* -20.757  -190.042  
(-1.81) (-1.07) (-1.25) 
Intra-board connections 6,048.761
*** 312.791*** 5,067.444*** 
(5.81) (2.92) (6.49) 
Industry experience -94.067  -12.342  -117.231  (-0.57) (-0.70) (-0.73) 
Graduate degrees 3,364.925
*** 53.539** 2,971.868*** 
(13.11) (2.15) (12.22) 
Elite education 162.379  -13.357  86.551  (0.96) (-0.63) (0.52) 
Log(Board size) -2,939.770
*** -38.269  -2,532.480*** 
(-7.16) (-0.72) (-6.42) 
Proportion of inside directors -5,686.160
*** 294.994*** -6,252.270*** 
(-11.23) (3.32) (-11.27) 
CEO tenure 8.587  -3.980
* -3.114  
(0.37) (-1.66) (-0.14) 
Dual CEO/Chair 100.898  107.220
*** -31.678  
(0.53) (4.54) (-0.17) 
Leverage  -103.395  2.461  -131.872
* 
(-1.41) (0.29) (-1.96) 
Regulation dummy  -244.220  9.118  -81.842  (-1.35) (0.44) (-0.54) 
CEO ownership 2.644  5.537  -1.999  (0.17) (1.51) (-0.13) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5,307 5,307 5,307 





In this paper, I assess whether directors’ external connections influence director labor market outcomes, specifically, 
director compensation. I find that directors with more extensive external connections earn more than those with more 
limited external connections, supporting the argument that directors’ external connections are strategically valuable 
to firms, thus, should be factored into director compensation (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). My findings show that 
the directors’ external connections are positively associated with the level of director compensation. This association 
holds after controlling for directors’ experience and educational attributes which are also potential determinants of 
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director compensation. It also holds after controlling for firm specific fixed effects. I also find that the level of 
compensation of grey directors is not different from that of independent directors when I control for grey directors 
who were former CEOs in the same firms for which they now hold director positions. 
 
In further analysis, I find that professional connections are the most important determinant of pay for serving as a 
director for outside directors. However, I find that educational connections as well as professional connections are 
significantly associated with the level of compensation for employee directors. My robustness test shows that my 
primary results are unlikely to be confounded by CEO and board related governance characteristics. These results 
suggest that directors with more extensive connections earn more than those with more limited connections. 
 
Although this paper focused on the association between the extent of directors’ external connections and the level of 
director compensation and provided evidence that directors with more extensive connections earn more and firms are 
willing to pay for the connections, it would be interesting to expand the questions I posed in this paper by examining 
whether the way in which directors are compensated has to do with how to motivate directors to work hard as monitors 
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